The problem becomes clearer by spotlighting details of high-profile terrorism cases. Consider the ease with which the 9/11 hijackers gained access to planes that morning. The box-cutter knives they carried were permitted on board because, at the time, any knife with a blade up to four inches long was permitted on domestic flights.

Just as important, some hijackers lacked a valid, U.S. Government-issued identification card. These Al Qaeda members were allowed to board their planes anyway.

Next, consider “shoe bomber,” Richard Reid, who was permitted to board an American Airlines flight in Paris on December 22, 2001, wearing plastic explosives in his shoes. He was allowed to board despite his having been prevented from flying the previous day due to his unwillingness to answer all of the passenger screener’s questions, and despite the fact that he did not check any luggage.

In December 2009, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab tried detonating plastic explosives in his underwear while on a Northwest Airlines flight en route from Amsterdam to Detroit. A month prior, Abdulmutallab’s father had expressed concerns over his son’s drift toward religious extremism to CIA officers at the U.S. Embassy in Abuja, Nigeria. Although Abdulmutallab’s name was added to one watch list — the Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment — it was not on the U.S. no-fly list, nor was his U.S. visa revoked.

More recently, Times Square bomber Faisal Shahzad successfully boarded an Emirates flight at Kennedy International Airport bound for Dubai before being detained shortly prior to takeoff. He had been placed on the no-fly list earlier in the day, but the airline did not check the list when Shahzad made a reservation, nor when he purchased his ticket with cash. A routine post-boarding check did identify him as being on the list, leading to his arrest.

Despite the varying circumstances involved in these incidents, they might never have occurred if certain security measures involving new technology had been in place.

The “no fly” list, created and maintained by the U.S. Government, consists of names of individuals who are barred from boarding commercial aircraft for travel into or out of the country. Created soon after 9/11, its use has stirred controversy for incidences of false positives, in which law-abiding citizens have been mistakenly detained. Additionally, the list played a prominent role in the incidents involving Abdulmutallab and Shahzad. What good is such a list, critics rightfully ask, if it fails to keep such people from boarding planes?

Although the officials charged with checking the no-fly list may be lax in their duties, technology currently exists to perform such checks efficiently. Electronic devices have been developed that can scan a passenger’s ID card (e.g., a driver’s license or military ID card) at the boarding gate, validate its authenticity, determine whether it is lost or stolen, and check whether the bearer’s identity is included on a watch or terrorist list.

For example, the Defense ID system, developed by Intellicheck Mobilisa Inc., consists of a handheld device that reads barcodes and magnetic stripes on various forms of ID cards. By scanning and comparing the information to more than 140 “bad guy” and FBI Watch databases, Defense ID can determine in the space of a few seconds if the ID is fake, if it has been reported lost or stolen, if the individual presenting it has any outstanding wants and warrants, and if the individual is on an authorized roster of previously cleared personnel. In addition, Defense ID has photo-capture, incident recording and manual search capabilities. It could easily be adapted to check the federal “no fly” list.

Cutting-edge verification technology alone will not guarantee the safeguarding of airports against potential terrorist attack, unless the technology is implemented wisely. Keeping potential terrorists away from secure areas in airports, or aircraft, requires an ambitious level of oversight. At airports, security will be maximized only when the implementation of ID readers is complete.

John F. Kennedy International Airport, out of which Faisal Shahzad nearly managed to fly, has eight terminals and 14 security checkpoints. Yet the expense of fully implementing ID scanning technology at those checkpoints has been estimated to cost as little as $1.5 million. For the price of a few full-body scanning machines, the State of New York could deploy technology that would screen people against the “no fly” list before they ever boarded an aircraft.

In the future, the fast-evolving science of biometrics will render the use of fake or stolen IDs even less feasible. One can envision a technology in which a passenger’s fingerprint is scanned at the boarding gate and instantly checked against a “no fly” database. Another innovation would be the use of a single universal database consisting of names of individuals of interest, updated in real time, and accessible at all security checkpoints. This would be designed to eliminate oversights, such as that which occurred in the case of Abdulmutallab, whose name appeared on one watch list but not another.

Full article by Steve Williams, Government Security News